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ABSTRACT This article considers an issue of global importance that has
received little scholarly attention: whether the Court ofArbitration for Sport
(CAS), whose developing body of lex sportiva is a form of international legal
pluralism, provides an appropriate level of procedural fairness and
substantive justice to the world's athletes, who are subject to its jurisdiction
as a condition of their participation in Olympic and international sports
competition. It provides an overview of the CAS arbitration system and the
very limited scope of national judicial review of its arbitration awards
decisions. It concludes that the CAS is a procedurally fair private legal
system for resolving Olympic and international sports disputes that generally
provides substantive justice to athletes, thereby justifying judicial deference
to its adjudications along with their recognition and enforcement by
sovereign nations. It also makes some recommendations for internal CAS
reforms to better achieve these objectives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of this article is to analyze whether the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS), a private independent international arbitration
tribunal based in Lausanne, Switzerland, provides an appropriate level of
procedural fairness and substantive justice to the world's athletes, who are
subject to its jurisdiction as a condition of their participation in Olympic and
international sports competition, to justify an exceptional degree of judicial
deference by national courts and sovereign countries' recognition and
enforcement of its arbitration awards. This has enabled the development and
evolution of a separate body of Olympic and international sports law
jurisprudence by the CAS that is based primarily on underlying private
agreements, which constitutes a form of global legal pluralisml that coexists
with-and sometimes displaces-sovereign national laws. Thus far,
however, there has been little scholarly analysis of this phenomenon and its
implications for the resolution of disputes with international dimensions by
private tribunals rather than international or national courts.
The International Olympic Committee (JOC), a private association based
in Lausanne, Switzerland, has exercised monolithic rulemaking and
governing authority over Olympic sports competition throughout the world
1 See generally GUNTHER TEUBNER, GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A.STATE, xiii (1997)
("[The] globalization of law creates a multitude of decentred law-making processes in
various sectors of civil society, independently of nation-states.... They claim worldwide
validity independently of the law of nation-states and in relative distance to the rules of
international public law. They have come into existence not by formal acts of nation-
states but by strange paradoxical acts of self-validation."); Matthew J. Mitten & Hayden
Opie, "Sports Law": Implications for the Development of International, Comparative,
and National Law and Global Dispute Resolution, 85 TuL. L. REv. 269, 289 (2010) ("For
legal theorists, the evolving body of lex sportiva established by CAS awards is an
interesting and important example of global legal pluralism without states, arising out of
the resolution of Olympic and international sports disputes between private parties.").
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since 1894.2 There are no sport-specific national laws that directly regulate
the IOC or the International Federations (IFs), which individually oversee a
particular sport or related sports on a worldwide basis, international and
national legislative bodies generally permit the IOC and IFs to govern their
own affairs without government intervention.
Although Olympic athletes have a voice and representation on IOC rule
and bodies, they lack any collective veto power and must "agree to" the
eligibility rules (including anti-doping rules established by the World Anti-
doping Agency) and dispute resolution processes chosen by the IOC as a
condition of having the opportunity to participate in Olympic sports
competition. The CAS arbitration system, which was established by the IOC
in 1983,3 resolves the merits of virtually all disputes involving Olympic sport
athletes with very limited judicial review by the Swiss Federal Tribunal
(Switzerland's highest court) and other national courts.4 Even if they have
jurisdiction, courts generally are reluctant to apply national public laws in a
manner that constrains the plenary governing authority of these international
sports bodies in their relations with athletes, or that precludes or invalidates
the final and binding resolution of disputes by the CAS.
Section II of this Article provides a brief description of the international
governing structure and rulemaking processes for Olympic sports as well as
the historical reluctance of national courts to use domestic non-sports
specific public laws to externally regulate Olympic sports. Section III
provides an overview of the CAS arbitration system and the very limited
scope of national judicial review of its decisions. Section IV proposes several
requirements that a procedurally fair and substantively just private legal
system for resolving Olympic and international sports disputes should have,
thereby justifying judicial deference to its adjudications along with
recognition and enforcement by sovereign nations. Section V analyzes
whether the CAS arbitration system generally satisfies these requirements.
This Article concludes by determining that it does, while suggesting some
potential reforms to enhance the existing level of procedural fairness and
substantive justice the CAS arbitration system provides to athletes.
2 See generally MATTHEW J. MITTEN, TIMOTHY DAVIS, RODNEY K. SMITH & N.
JEREMI DURU, SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 259-
62 (3d ed. 2013).
3 Origins, CAS, http://www.tas-cas.org/history (last visited Sept. 4, 2014).
4 See infra notes 81-90.
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II. OLYMPIC SPORTS INTERNAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND
RULEMAKING PROCESSES
The modem Olympic Movement "is the concerted, organised, universal
and permanent action, carried out under the supreme authority of the IOC, of
all individuals and entities who are inspired by the values of Olympism,"
which "is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole
the qualities of body, will and mind." 5 It "[b]lend[s] sport with culture and
education" and "seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the
educational value of good example, social responsibility and respect for
universal fundamental ethical principles." 6 In addition to the IOC, the
Olympic Movement includes IFs, the international governing bodies for each
Olympic sport; National Olympic Committees (NOCs), such as the United
States Olympic Committee (USOC); National Federations (NFs) for each
Olympic sport recognized by each NOC (for example, USA Track & Field);
thousands of individual athletes, judges, and coaches who are members of the
NFs for their respective Olympic sports; and others.7
The following diagram illustrates that a series of hierarchical contractual
relationships define the governing structure for the Olympic Games:
IOC
(Supreme Governing Authority for Olympic Sports)
IFs NOCs
(International Governing Body (National Governing Body
for each Sport(s)) for Olympic Sports)
NFs
(National Governing Body for Each Sport)
5 INT'L OLYMPIC COMM., OLYMPIC CHARTER, 11 (entered into force Sept. 9, 2013)
[hereinafter OLYMPIC CHARTER], available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olymp
iccharter en.pdf.
6 Id.
7 Id. R. 1(1M-3), at 15.
4
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The Olympic Charter codifies the fundamental principles, rules, and
bylaws adopted by the IOC, and it establishes the framework for governance
of the Olympic Movement and operation of the Olympic Games.8 It states
that the IOC, an "international non-governmental not-for-profit
organisation" 9 is the "supreme authority" of the Olympic Movement, 10 and
that all members of the Olympic Movement are "bound by the provisions of
the Olympic Charter and shall abide by the decisions of the IOC."I I
The IOC currently has 105 members, 12 all whom are individuals who
"represent and promote the interests of the IOC and of the Olympic
Movement in their countries."13 The total number of IOC members cannot
exceed 115; no more than 15 of them may be active athletes who are
members of the IOC Athletes' Commission. 14 The duties of IOC members
include adopting and amending the Olympic Charter, electing the IOC
president, vice presidents, and other m'embers of the executive board, and
collectively making final decisions on behalf of the IOC.15
The IOC Athletes' Commission "serves as a consultative body and is the
link between active athletes and the International Olympic Committee." 16 It
represents athletes within the Olympic Movement and to ensure that their
interests are protected. A majority of the Commission's members must be
athletes who are elected by Olympic athletes; 17 elections of new members
occur when the Games of the Olympiad (i.e., Summer Games) and the
Olympic Winter Games are held.
8 Id. at 9.
9 1d. R. 15, at 31.
10 d. R. 1(4), at 16.
11 Id.
12 IOC Members, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www.olympic.org/content/the-ioc/the-ioc-
institution/ioc-members-list/ (last visited May 5, 2013).
13 OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 5, R. 16(1.4), at 33.
14 Id. R. 16(1.1), at 32. New IOC members are elected by the IOC's existing
membership for renewable eight-year terms after being submitted as candidates by "IOC
members, IFs, associations of IFs, NOCs, world or continental associations of NOCs and
other organisations recognised by the IOC," reviewed by the IOC Nominations
Commission, and proposed by the IOC Executive Board. Id. R. 16, Bye-law 2.1, at 36-
37.
15 1d. R. 18, at 41.
16 Athletes' Commission, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www.olympic.org/athletes-
commission (last visited May 5, 2013).
17 OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 5, R. 21, Bye-law 1, at 48-49.
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The governance of Olympic sports is based on the European model of
sports, a hierarchical, inverted pyramid model in which each sport is
governed vertically on a global basis by an international body with
corresponding transnational, national, regional, and local federations. 18 Each
of the 64 IFs currently recognized by the IOC are international
nongovernmental organizations that function as the worldwide governing
body for a particular sport (or a related group of sports), and each one's
respective members are the NFs that administer the particular sport(s) in each
country. 19 An IF's statutes, practices, and activities, including its athlete
eligibility criteria for the Olympic Games, must conform to the Olympic
Charter and be approved by the IOC; each IF must adopt and implement the
World Anti-Doping Code (WADC).20 Subject to these requirements, "each
IF maintains its independence and autonomy in the administration of its
sport."2 1
The more than 200 NOCs develop and protect the Olympic Movement
within their respective countries consistent with the Olympic Charter and are
required to adopt and implement the WADC. 22 Each NOC "is obliged to
participate in the Games of the Olympiad by sending athletes." 23 An NOC
"has exclusive authority regarding the representation of its country at the
Olympic Games" and selects its athletes based on the recommendations of its
recognized NF for the particular sport.24
An NF2 5 is the national governing authority for a particular sport that is a
member of the corresponding IF and is recognized by the country's NOC.26
NFs must comply with the Olympic Charter and their respective IF's rules as
18 See generally James A.R. Nafziger, European and North American Models of
Sports Organization, in HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 90-93 (James A.R.
Nafziger & Stephen F. Ross eds., 2011); LARS HALGREEN, EUROPEAN SPORTS LAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN MODELS OF SPORT (2004).
19 OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 5, R. 25, at 53.
20 Id. See WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE (entered into
force Jan. 1, 2009) [hereinafter WADC], available at https://wada-main-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/wada-anti-dopingcode_2009 en_0.pdf.
21 OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 5, R.25, at 53.
22 Id. R. 27, at 57-58.
23 Id. R. 27(3), at 58.
24 MITTEN, DAVIS, SMITH & DURU, supra note 2, at 260.
25 In the U.S., National Governing Body (NGB) is the commonly used terminology.
26 MITTEN, DAVIS, SMITH & DURU, supra note 2, at 260-61.
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well as "exercise a specific, real and on-going sports activity."27 The NFs
serve a function at the national level similar to that of the IFs at the
international level of athletic competition.
The Olympic Charter provides that "the practice of sport is a human
right"28 and requires all NOCs to ensure that no athlete "has been excluded
for racial, religious or political reasons or by reason of other forms of
discrimination." 29 However, no athlete "is entitled as of right to participate
in the Olympic Games" and his or her "entry is subject to acceptance by the
IOC, which may at its discretion, at any time, refuse any entry, without
indication of grounds." 30 To be eligible to participate in the Olympic Games,
a competing athlete must satisfy several conditions, including being a
national of the country of the NOC that is entering him 31 and complying
with the eligibility requirements of the Olympic Charter and IF for the
subject sport.32 All athletes must "respect the spirit of fair play and non-
violence, and behave accordingly" on the sports field as well as fully comply
with the WADC. 33
Historically, courts have been reluctant to use general national laws (i.e.,
statutes not specifically applicable to sports) protecting individual civil
liberties to externally regulate Olympic sports competition within their
respective countries' boundaries or to interfere with valid decision and
rulemaking authority, even if the challenged conduct of the IOC subjects it to
the court's jurisdiction. As one scholar has observed, "[t]he IOC increasingly
acts [as] a global legislator in international sport, setting common
standards." 34 Courts generally defer to the IOC's private plenary authority
rather than judicially invalidating its rules, even if they allegedly violate
athletes' civil liberties as defined under their national laws. For example, in
Martin v. International Olympic Committee,3 5 the Ninth Circuit rejected
plaintiffs' claims that not including the same 5,000 and 10,000-meter track
27 OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 5, R. 29, at 63.2 8 Id. at 11.
29 Id. R. 44(4), at 80.
30 Id. R. 44(3), at 79.
31 Id. R. 41, at 78.
32 Id. R. 40, at 77.
33 Id.
34 Ken Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for Sport's
Jurisprudence, in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, 420, 438 (Ian S.
Blackshaw, Robert C.R. Siekmann & Janwillem Soek eds., 2006).
35 740 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1984).
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events for women that existed for men in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic
Games constituted illegal gender discrimination. The court explained: "[W]e
find persuasive the argument that a court should be wary of applying a state
statute to alter the content of the Olympic Games. The Olympic Games are
organized and conducted under the terms of an international agreement-the
Olympic Charter." 3 6
Consistent with Martin, the British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected a
similar gender discrimination claim under Canadian law in connection with
the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games. In Sagen v. Vancouver Organizing
Committee for the 2010 Olympic & Paralympic Winter Games,37 the court
ruled that the IOC's decision not to include women's ski jumping as an event
in the Vancouver Games (while including men's ski jumping events) did not
violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
III. OVERVIEW OF CAS ARBITRATION SYSTEM AND ITS LEGAL
RECOGNITION
The Olympic Charter states that "any dispute arising on the occasion of,
or in connection with, the Olympic Games shall be submitted exclusively" to
the CAS. 3 8 As a condition of participating in the Olympic Games, athletes
36 Id. at 677. Adopting a similar deferential approach, U.S. courts have rejected state
discrimination law claims by foreign athletes seeking to march in Olympic Games
opening ceremonies held in the United States under flags of countries not recognized by
the IOC. See, e.g., Spindulys v. Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Comm., 175 Cal. App.
3d 206, 220 Cal. Rptr. 565 (Cal. App. 1985); Ren-Guey v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic
Games, 72 A.D.2d 439, 424 N.Y.S.2d 533, affd, 49 N.Y.2d 771, 429 N.Y.S.2d 473
(1980).
37 Sagen v. Vancouver Org. Comm. For the 2010 Olympic & Paralympic Winter
Games, 98 B.C.L.R.4th 141 (Can. B.C.). The Supreme Court of Canada refused
appellants' leave to appeal. Sagen v. Vancouver Org. Comm. for the 2010 Olympic &
Paralympic Winter Games, 2009 Carswell BC 3468 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL).
38 OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 5, R. 61(2), at 105. More broadly, it also provides
that any disputes regarding the IOC decisions or its application or interpretation of the
Olympic Charter are to be submitted to the CAS for resolution. Id. R 61(1), at 105.
However, national courts or arbitration systems generally are used to resolve purely
domestic disputes between athletes and their respective NOCs and/or NFs regarding their
eligibility or qualifications to be selected for the country's Olympic team. See, e.g.,
Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 007, Sieracki v IOC, award of 21
September 2000 in CAS Awards-Sydney 2000 at 81 (recognizing withdrawal of U.S.
athlete's appeal because underlying dispute with USA Wrestling and USOC resolved by
American A.rbitration Association arbitration award, the validity of which was confirmed
by U.S. court).
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are required to submit any disputes in connection therewith to the CAS for
final resolution.39 Outside of the Olympic Games, virtually all IFs have
agreed to CAS jurisdiction and their rules generally require their respective
NFs and athletes to submit all disputes with the IF to CAS arbitration.40 All
disputes arising out of the application, interpretation, or enforcement of the
WADC (e.g., international athlete doping violations and sanctions) also are
resolved by CAS arbitration.4 1
The CAS's jurisdiction and authority as an arbitration tribunal is based
on agreement of the parties;42 its origin and association with the Olympic
Movement have facilitated its recognition and acceptance as the world's
"supreme court for sport." Courts generally will enforce a written arbitration
agreement requiring that the parties submit a dispute to CAS for resolution as
well as IOC or IF rules requiring arbitration before the CAS as a condition of
participating in an Olympic or international athletic competition, which bars
an athlete from litigating the merits of the subject dispute in a judicial
forum.43
The CAS "provides a forum for the world's athletes and sports
federations to resolve their disputes through a single, independent and
accomplished sports adjudication body that is capable of consistently
applying the rules of different sports organizations," and it "ensures fairness
and integrity in sport through sound legal control and the administration of
diverse laws and philosophies." 44 Its creation recognizes the need for a
unitary international legal system that protects the integrity of Olympic and
39 See OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 5, R. 40, at 77; see also id. R. 61, at 105.
40 Cricket currently is the only major international sport that has not done so.
41 WADC, supra note 20, art. 13.2.1.
42 CAS, CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION 8 (2013) [hereinafter CODE], R27,
available at http://www.tascas.org/d2wfiles/document/4962/5048/0/Code20201320correc
tions20finales20(en).pdf. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
43 N. v. Federation Equestre Internationale (Swiss Federal Tribunal 1996), in DIGEST
OF CAS AwARDS 1986-1998 585 (Reeb, ed. 1998); Raguz v. Sullivan, 2000 NSW
LEXIS 265 (Sup. Ct. NSW, Ct. of Appeal 2000); see also infra notes 79 and
accompanying text. But see Slaney v IAAF, 244 F.3d 580, 591 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing
that valid written agreement to arbitrate before a foreign sports arbitral tribunal is
enforceable in the U.S. under an international treaty, the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, but "[w]hether Slaney's written agreement
to follow the rules of the USATF [U.S. NGB for track and field] would satisfy the
requirement of an agreement in writing for purposes of enforcing an arbitration
agreement with the IAAF [IF for track and field] is a question we need not resolve").
4 Richard H. McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena
for the World's Sports Disputes, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 379, 381 (2001).
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international athletics competition, while also safeguarding athletes'
legitimate rights and adhering to fundamental principles of natural justice.45
In 1994, the International Council of Arbitration and Sport (ICAS), a
group of 20 distinguished jurists or international lawyers with a background
in sports or arbitration,46 was created pursuant to a multi-party agreement
between the IOC, the Association of Summer Olympic International
Federations, the Association of International Winter Sports Federations, and
the Association of National Olympic Committees. 47 The ICAS oversees the
CAS, manages its funds, and appoints its member arbitrators (functions that
previously were done by the IOC),48 as well as promulgates the Code of
Sports-Related Arbitration (Code), 49 which governs the organization,
operations, and procedures of the CAS. The purpose of ICAS "is to facilitate
the resolution of sports-related disputes through arbitration or mediation and
45 Tricia Kavanagh, The Doping Cases and the Need for the International Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS), 22 UNIv. NEW S. WALES L.J. 721, 723 (1999).
46 Most current or former ICAS members "are substantial people in the world of
international law," including "cabinet level officials of France, Syria, and Egypt; the
president as well as former current judges of the International Court of Justice at the
Hague; the president of the Supreme Court of India and a member of Switzerland's
[highest court]; two United States federal appellate judges; two presidents of the ICC
Court of Arbitration (which is the premier international arbitration body); the president of
the Constitutional Court for Bosnia-Herzegovina; [and] the president of the U.S.-Iran
claims tribunal at the Hague." Michael Lenard, The Future of Sports Dispute Resolution,
10 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 173, 176 (2009).
47 The ICAS was established in response to dicta in a case decided by the Swiss
Federal Tribunal, Switzerland's highest court that expressed concern about the CAS's
independence from the IOC. In G. v. Federation Equestre Internationale (Swiss Federal
Tribunal 1993), in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 561 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998), a
horse rider challenged the validity of a CAS award affirming the International Equestrian
Federation's finding of a doping violation and imposition of a disciplinary sanction. He
contended that the CAS was not sufficiently independent and impartial to be considered a
valid arbitral authority whose decisions should be given binding legal effect. Finding that
"the CAS is a true arbitral tribunal independent of the parties, which freely exercises
complete juridical control over the decisions of the associations which are brought before
it," the Swiss court upheld the validity of the CAS award and ruled that "the CAS offers
the guarantees of independence upon which Swiss law makes conditional the valid
exclusion of ordinary judicial recourse." Id. at 568-69. Observing that the IOC
established the CAS's rules, appointed its members, and paid its operating costs, the court
limited its holding to "proceedings conducted before the CAS in which the IOC does not
appear as a party." Id. at 569.
48 The IOC, IFs, and NOCs continue to fund the operations of ICAS and the CAS,
but they do not govern or administer either organization.
49 CODE, supra note 42.
10
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to safeguard the independence of CAS and the rights of the parties." 50
Members of the ICAS cannot serve as CAS arbitrators or represent a party in
a case before the CAS. 5 1
The Code broadly provides that the mission of the CAS is to constitute
arbitration panels having "the responsibility of resolving disputes arising in
the context of sport" in accordance with its procedural rules.52 However, it
will not resolve any and all sports-related issues. The CAS generally
considers disputes involving a sport's rules of the game and referee field of
play decisions to be non-justiciable to avoid interfering with the autonomy of
Olympic and international sports governing bodies to determine or resolve
these issues.53
At the site of each Olympic Games, the CAS operates an ad hoc
Division, which consists of a pool of CAS arbitrators specifically chosen by
the ICAS, 54 to provide for expedited resolution of all disputes that arise
during the Games or during a period of ten days preceding the Opening
Ceremony, 55 including those between an athlete and the IOC or an IF. 56
50 Id. at S2.
51 Id. at S5.
52 Id. at S12. In addition to the ad hoc Division and appeals arbitrations procedures,
the CAS also has an ordinary arbitration procedure that is used to resolve sports-related
disputes between the parties relating to matters such as sponsorship contracts, television
rights to sports events, and contracts between athletes and their agents. Id.
53 James A.R. Nafziger, Defining the Scope and Structure of International Sports
Law: Four Conceptual Issues, INT'L SPORTS L.J. 14, 18 (2011).
54 Usually fifteen arbitrators are selected for the Summer Olympic Games and nine
arbitrators for the Winter Olympic Games.
55 See generally GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS:
ISSUES OF FAST-TRACK DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SPORTS LAW (2001); Richard H.
McLaren, Introducing the Court of Arbitration for Sport: The Ad Hoc Division at the
Olympic Games, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 515, 517 (2001).
56 The first CAS ad hoc Division panel operated at the 1996 Summer Olympic
Games in Atlanta. ICAS member Michael Lenard notes that there were two reasons for
establishing the CAS ad hoc Division:
The first reason was because of the Butch Reynolds case in 1992.
Anyone who is interested in athletes' rights knows that story. Butch
Reynolds won a court case in the United States in order to compete in
the Barcelona Olympic Games and the IAAF (the track and field IF)
said, "So what? We do not live in the United States. Come and sue us
in Barcelona two days before the Games start and see if we will let
you in." Because of the structure of sport, the IOC could not overrule
the IAAF. That scenario posed a large problem for athletes' rights. It
became a key reason for, and the hallmark of future, Ad-hoc Panels'
11
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Disputes are resolved by a panel of three arbitrators appointed by a member
of the ICAS who serves as president of the CAS ad hoc Division. The
applicable substantive law is the Olympic Charter and the general principles
and rules of law that the arbitration panel deems appropriate. 57 A written
arbitration award generally must be rendered within 24 hours of the filing of
a request for CAS adjudication.58
Outside of the Olympic Games, the CAS appeals arbitration procedure is
used to resolve appeals from final decisions of the IOC or an IF, including
athlete doping, discipline, and other eligibility issues. 59 These proceedings
usually are before a three-person panel chosen from a closed list of
approximately 300 arbitrators; 60 each party selects one arbitrator, and the
president of the CAS appeals arbitration procedure (who is an ICAS
member) appoints the third arbitrator who serves as the panel's chair.6 1 The
applicable substantive laws generally are the relevant sport governing body
rules (e.g., IOC or IF rules) and the law of the country in which the
governing body is domiciled, 62 although the CAS panel has authority to
resolve the dispute according to the "rules of law" it deems appropriate. 63
purpose: "Never leave an athlete knocking at the gate of the Olympic
Village." The other reason for the Ad-hoc Panel was the fear that,
without an alternative, athletes would run into federal court in Atlanta,
and the rulings would disrupt the Games. Lenard, supra note 46, at
177.
57 ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES, art. 17 (2012), available at
http://www.tascas.org/d2wfiles/document/422/5048/0/RULES200G20FOR20LONDON
20201220 ENG.pdf.
58 Id. at art. 18.
59 CODE, supra note 42, at R. 47.
60 See infra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
61 CODE, supra note 42, at R. 53-54.
62 Id. at R. 58. See, e.g., Pistorius v. IAAF, Court of Arbitration for Sport,
2008/A/1480, (award of 16 May 2008) (applying IF's rules and the law of the country in
which the IF is based (Monaco), but not the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities and its Optional Protocol because Monaco has not signed or ratified this
international treaty at the time of the parties' dispute); Michael Straubel, Enhancing the
Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of Arbitration for Sport Can Do Its
Job Better, 36 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1251 (2006) ("While the primary source of
supplementary law used by panels is Swiss domestic law, largely due to the fact that
many IFs are headquartered in Switzerland, panels have also drawn upon the domestic
law of the United Kingdom, general principles of law, civil law traditions, and concepts
from international human rights.") (citations omitted).
63 As one CAS panel observed:
12
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The CAS panel must issue a written award that resolves the dispute within
three months after receiving the case file. 64
Regardless of its geographical location, the "seat" of all CAS arbitration
proceedings is always deemed to be Lausanne, Switzerland. 65 This ensures
uniform procedural rules for all CAS arbitrations, which provides a stable
legal framework and facilitates efficient dispute resolution in locations
convenient for the parties. 66 All parties in any CAS arbitration proceeding
may be represented by counsel. 67 The Code does not establish any formal
rules of evidence, although it authorizes a CAS panel to limit or disallow
witness testimony on the grounds of relevance, 68 thus providing the panel
with significant discretion regarding the admissibility of evidence.
The Panel is of the opinion that all sporting institutions, and in
particular all international federations, must abide by general
principles of law. Due to the transnational nature of sporting
competitions, the effects of the conduct and deeds of international
federations are felt in a sporting community throughout various
countries. Therefore, the substantive and procedural rules to be
respected by international federations cannot be reduced only to its
own statutes and regulations and to the laws of the country where the
federation is incorporated or of the country where its headquarters are.
Sports law has developed and consolidated along the years,
particularly through the arbitral settlement of disputes, a set of
unwritten legal principles - a sort of lex mercatoria for sports or, so to
speak, a [lex sportiva] - to which national and international sports
federations must conform, regardless of the presence of such
principles within their own statutes and regulations or within any
applicable national law, provided that they do not conflict with any
national <public policy>> (<ordre public>) provision applicable to a
given case. Certainly, general principles of law drawn from a
comparative or common denominator reading of various domestic
legal systems and, in particular, the prohibition of arbitrary or
unreasonable rules and measures can be deemed to be part of such [lex
sportiva].
AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague / Union of European Football Associations
(UEFA), Arbitration CAS 98/200 (award of 20 August 1999), at 1156.
64 CODE, supra note 42, R. 59.
65 Id. at R28; ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES, supra note 58, at art.
7. There also are CAS offices in New York City and Sydney, Australia.
66 Raguz v. Sullivan, 2000 NSW LEXIS 265, *47-49 (Sup. Ct. NSW, Ct. of Appeal
2000).
67 CODE, supra note 42, R. 30.
68 Id. at R. 44.2 & R. 57.
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In both CAS ad hoc Division and appeals arbitration proceedings, the
arbitration panel provides de novo review of the challenged IOC or IF rule or
decision. 69 This standard of review means the CAS panel is not "limited in
any way in its review of both the facts and law"70 relevant to the dispute.
Thus, the parties may introduce new evidence and make additional legal
arguments in the CAS proceeding that were not considered by the IOC or IF
internal decision-making bodies. The scope of CAS de novo review is
broader than the very narrow "arbitrary and capricious" or "rational basis"
standards that national courts generally apply when reviewing sport
governing body rules and decisions.7 1
The CAS panel adjudicates the dispute by majority decision and issues a
written award setting forth the reasons for its decision. All CAS ad hoc
Division and most appeals arbitration awards are published. 72 The CAS
69 Article R. 57 states: "The Panel has full power to review the facts and the law. It
may issue a new decision which replaces the decision challenged or annul the decision
and refer the case back to the previous instance." Id. at R. 57. See also ARBITRATION
RULES FOR THE OLYMPic GAMES, supra note 57, art. 16 ("The Panel shall have full power
to establish the facts on which the application is based."); id. at art. 17 ("The Panel shall
rule on the dispute pursuant to the Olympic Charter, the applicable regulations, general
principles of law and the rules of law, the application of which it deems appropriate.").
70 D'Arcy v. Australian Olympic Committee, Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1574, 42
(award of 11 June 2008). Rather, "it is the duty of the [appeal panel] to make its
independent determination of whether the Appellant's contentions are correct, not to
limit itself to assessing the correctness of the award or decision from which the appeal
was brought." Id. at 54. Pursuant to Rule 57 of the Code, a CAS panel "not only has
the power to establish whether the decision of the first instance was or was not lawful,
but to issue an independent and free standing decision." Despina Mavromati & Pauline
Pellaux, Article R57 of the CAS Code: A Purely Procedural Provision?, in COURT OF
ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, CAS SEMINAR MONTRIEUx 2011 at 57, 59 (2012). It must
apply (but not rewrite) the existing rules and law to the facts and respect the wide
discretion that a private sport governing body has to make and enforce its rules.
However, "Article R57 does not mean that the Panel will disregard the assessment made
by the first-instance adjudicating body without having specific reasons to do so." Id. at
60. Therefore, "[w]hen the applicable provision provides a certain margin of
appreciation, CAS panels may freely use it and substitute their appreciation to the
previous instance's one without deeming that it was manifestly erroneous, while some
times they will be more deferential; both attitudes are in line with the CAS Code." Id. at
60-61.
71 D'Arcy, supra note 70, at TT 30, 42. See generally Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy
Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal Protection of Sports Participation
Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 130-31 (2008).
72 CODE, supra note 42, R. 59. The parties may agree that a CAS appeals arbitration
award will be confidential.
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Secretary General (Matthieu Reeb), who oversees administration of the CAS,
has published separate volumes of ad hoc Division awards for each Olympic
Games 73 and a three-volume Digest of CAS Awards, which includes
selected appeals arbitration awards (some of which are edited) rendered from
1986-2003.74 CAS awards after 2003 are posted on the CAS website, but not
all awards are readily available and accessible. 75
Both CAS ad hoc Division and appeals arbitration awards provide final
and binding resolution of the parties' dispute, subject to judicial review by
the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT), Switzerland's highest court. 76 In Canas v.
ATP Tour,7 7 the SFT refused to enforce an IF's contractual waiver, which
required an athlete to agree not to judicially appeal a CAS award as a
condition of allowing him to participate in its organized or sponsored events.
The court initially determined that an athlete's agreement to arbitrate a
dispute before the CAS is enforceable because it "promotes the swift
settlement of [sports} disputes ... by specialized arbitral tribunals that offer
sufficient guarantees of independence and impartiality."78 It then noted the
importance of ensuring that athletes are not forced to waive their right to
appeal a CAS award to the SFT, which is "the supreme judicial authority of
the state in which the arbitral tribunal is domiciled" 79 . This is because "the
73 E.g., CAS, CAS AWARDS-SYDNEY 2000 (2000); CAS, CAS AWARDS-SALT
LAKE CITY 2002 & ATHENS 2004 (2004); CAS, CAS AWARDS-TURIN & MELBOURNE
2006 (2006); CAS, CAS AWARDS-BEIJING 2008 (2008).
74 CAS, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS: 1986-1998 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 1998); CAS,
DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II: 1998-2000 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2002); CAS, DIGEST OF CAS'
AWARDS III: 2001-2003 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2004).
75 Case Law Documents, CAS, http://jurisprudence.tascas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared
%20Documents/Forms/By%20Year.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
76 20 Questions About the CAS, CAS, http://www.tascas.org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-
231-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
77 Cafias v. ATP Tour, Tribunal federal [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 22, 2007
4P. 172/2006 (SWITZ.).
78 Id. at 4.3.2.3. But see Jan Lukomski, Arbitration Clauses in Sports Governing
Bodies'Statutes: Consent or Constraint? Analysis From the Perspective ofArticle 6(1) of
the European Convention on Human Rights, 13 INT'L SPORTS L.J. 60 (2013) ("Even if
arbitration clauses are valid from the point of view of Swiss legal system, which was
confirmed by Swiss Federal Supreme Court, it does not necessarily mean they are in
compliance with provisions of the European Convention ... in my view they are not"
because their enforcement denies athletes the right to a fair trial before a court of law).
79 Cafias v. ATP Tour, Tribunal federal [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 22, 2007
4P. 172/2006 (SWITZ.).
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continuing possibility of a[n] [judicial] appeal acts as a counterbalance" 80 to
the requirements of the IOC and IFs that Olympic and international sport
athletes must agree to submit disputes to the CAS as a condition of
participation in their athletic events.
Article 190(2) of the Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law of
December 18, 1987specifies only very limited procedural and substantive
grounds for judicially challenging a CAS award before the SFT.8 1
Procedural grounds for vacating an award include: an irregularity in the
composition of the arbitration panel (e.g., lack of independence or
impartiality); an erroneous assertion of jurisdiction; a failure to comply with
the scope of an arbitration agreement by not ruling on a submitted claim or
ruling on extraneous matters; or a violation of the parties' rights to be heard
or to be treated equally.82 The sole basis for challenging the substantive
merits of a CAS award is its incompatibility with Swiss public policy, a
defense that the SFT has construed very narrowly. According to the SFT, the
public policy defense "must be understood as a universal rather than national
concept, intended to penalize incompatibility with the fundamental legal or
moral principles acknowledged in all civilized states." 83 It has ruled that
"even the manifestly wrong application of a rule of law or the obviously
incorrect finding of a point of fact is still not sufficient to justify revocation
for breach of public policy of an award made in international arbitration
80 Id. Given the very limited scope of SFT review of CAS awards, this
"counterbalance" provides athletes with primarily procedural rights in connection with a
CAS arbitration proceeding rather than any right to appellate review of the merits of a
CAS award. See infra notes 177-179 and accompanying text.
81 SWITZERLAND'S FEDERAL CODE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, CAS (1987),
available at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/arbitrage.asp/4-3-292-1023-4-1-1/5-0-1023-3-0-0/.
The website of the Swiss law firm ZPG Avocats (http://www.praetor.chf) provides an
English translation of all SFT cases reviewing CAS awards from January 2008 to the
present, which enables these cases to be downloaded without charge. See Swiss
International Arbitration Decisions, http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/ (last
visited Nov. 11, 2013). See generally Charles Poncet, When Is a "Swiss" "award"
Appealable?, 2012 PARIS J. INT'L ARB. 135 (2012) (providing overview of SFT process
for reviewing CAS awards).
82 See generally Matthew J. Mitten, Judicial Review of Olympic and International
Sports Arbitration Awards: Trends and Observations, 10 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 51, 55-
58 (2009).
83 N., J., Y., W. v. FINA, 5P.83/1999 (1999) (Switz.), in CAS, DIGEST OF CAS
AWARDS II: 1998-2000 at 775, 779 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2002).
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proceedings." 84 The SFT has vacated very few CAS arbitration awards on
public policy grounds. 85
The CAS is recognized under the European Convention on the
Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental
Organizations. 86 CAS arbitration awards are enforceable in the 148 countries
that are signatories to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), an international treaty.87
As a foreign arbitration award in all countries except Switzerland, a CAS
award is subject to judicial review in national courts of countries, including
the U.S., that are parties to the New York Convention.88 Pursuant to Article
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, a national court may refuse to
recognize and enforce a CAS arbitration award if doing so "would be
84 Id at 779. See also Azerbaijan Field Hockey Fed'n. v. F6ddration Internationale
de Hockey, 4A 424/2008 at 7 (Switz.) ("The Swiss Federal Tribunal does not review
whether or not the Arbitral Tribunal rightly applied the law on which its decision rests.").
85 In Matuzalem v. FIFA, 4A_558/ Tribunal federal [TF] [Federal Supreme Court]
(2012) (Switz.), the SFT stated that the CAS's "substantive adjudication of a dispute
violates public policy only when it disregards some fundamental legal principles and
consequently becomes completely inconsistent with the important, generally recognized
values, which according to dominant opinions in Switzerland should be the basis of any
legal order." Id. at 4.1. It explained that an arbitral award would be "annulled only
when its result contradicts public policy and not merely its reasons." Id. at 4.1.
Applying this principle, the SFT vacated a CAS award upholding a Federation
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) disciplinary sanction prohibiting a soccer
player from playing professionally worldwide until he paid damages of 11,858,934 euros
for breaching his contract with his former club. The court ruled that the challenged CAS
award violated an individual's right to economic freedom protected by the Swiss civil
code, which "belongs to the important generally recognized order of values, which
according to dominant opinion in Switzerland should be the basis of any legal order." Id.
at 4.3.1. It concluded that the FIFA disciplinary sanction curtails the athlete's economic
freedom "to such an extent that the foundations of his economic existence are
jeopardized" and is "an obvious and grave violation" of the civil code, which is "contrary
to public policy." Id. at 14.3.2. To date, Matuzalem represents the only case in which the
SFT has vacated a CAS award on substantive grounds.
86 Ian S. Blackshaw, Introductory Remarks to BLACKSHAW ET AL., supra note 34, at
4 ("CAS rulings are legally effective and can be enforced internationally.").
87 New York Convention Countries, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states (last
visited Nov. 13, 2013).
88 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention], 9
U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
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contrary to the public policy of that country." 8 9 Similar to the SFT, U.S.
courts have construed this defense very narrowly and enforced the one CAS
award that has been judicially reviewed to date. 9 0
IV. GENERAL REQUISITES OF A PRIVATE LEGAL SYSTEM FOR
RESOLVING SPORTS DISPUTES THAT JUSTIFY JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND
SOVEREIGN RECOGNITION
All dispute resolution systems, whether governmental or private, should
aspire to provide procedural fairness and substantive justice.9 1 Procedural
fairhess means adequate notice of rules to individuals who may be affected
(as well as potential consequences for violations), along with an adequate
opportunity for them to present their case to an unbiased decision maker if
violations are alleged or disputes arise. 92 Substantive justice (i.e., just results
in individual cases) are a product of procedural fairness combined with a
good faith and rational decision based on the information presented by the
89 Id. at art. V(2)(b).
90 In Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Inc., 2008 WL 2567657 (N.D. Fla. 2008), a
federal district court ruled that a CAS arbitration award rejecting an athlete's claim that
his prior doping violation for taking prescribed medication violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which the court characterized as "arbitrary and capricious," did not
violate the New York Convention's public policy exception and justify its refusal to
recognize the award. See generally Mitten, supra note 82, at 62-66; Mitten & Opie,
supra note 1, at 301-302.
91 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 273-74, 278 (2d ed. 2006);
Amy Gangl, Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluations of the Lawmaking Process, 25
POL. BEHAV. 119, 135 (2003); Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used
by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOcY REv. 103, 132
(1988); Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking
Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 809, 827 (1994).
92 See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982); Mathews v.
Elridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See also Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to which Switzerland is a
contracting party, that creates an individual right to a "fair trial" requiring "a fair and
public hearing [including a public judgment] within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law, which decides on civil rights and obligations."
Ulrich Haas, Role and Application of Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) in CAS Procedures, in CAS, CAS SEMINAR MONTREUX 2011, 74, 74
(2012).
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parties, which follows applicable precedent and does not discriminate against
those affected (i.e., like cases produce like results).93
The IOC and IFs have plenary authority to adopt rules that determine
athletes' eligibility to compete, impose disciplinary sanctions, and take other
action that may adversely affect athletes' interests. Because they generally
require that all disputes be resolved by final and binding CAS arbitration, it
is essential that a private legal system for resolving Olympic and
international sports disputes provides "sports justice," particularly to the
athletes directly affected by their rules and decisions. Professor Roger
Abrams defines "sports justice" as "the product of the authoritative
procedures used in the business of sports to resolve disputes and
controversies," which he suggests should result in "objective, impartial,
unbiased, equitable, fair, [and] dispassionate" decisions.94
Professor James Nafziger notes that "[a] core principle, perhaps the core
principle to inform not only the lex sportiva, but also the larger body of
international sports law, is fairness."95 This encompasses both procedural
and substantive fairness. The former implicates "due process or natural
justice" concerns, specifically "the rule against bias and the right to a fair
hearing," which requires "prior notice of a decision, consultation and written
representation, adequate notice of applicable sanctions, an oral hearing, a
right to call and cross-examine witnesses, an opportunity for legal
representation, and a reasoned decision." 96 Recognizing that a "definition of
substantive fairness, in the sense of distributive justice, is more elusive" and
93 As one commentator notes: "It is of the very essence of any system of law, of
course, that its rules are consistent, accessible and predictable. Lawyers must be able to
advise their clients with a degree of confidence as to what those rules actually are. It is
only with such predictability that the core objectives of swift and inexpensive justice can
be achieved. Without legal certainty, every case, no matter how small and apparently
straightforward, will descend into an expensive legal debate." James Segan, Does the
Court ofArbitration for Sport Need a Grand Chamber, SPORTS L. BULL. (Apr. 19, 2013),
available at http://sportslawbulletin.org/2013/04/19/does-the-court-of-arbitration-for-
sport-need-a-grand-chamber/.
94 ROGER I. ABRAMs, SPORTS JUSTICE: THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF SPORTS 14
(2010). See also Josephine R. Potuto & Jerry R. Parkinson, IfIt Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It:
An Examination of The NCAA Division I Infractions Committee's Composition and
Decision-Making Process, 89 NEB. L. REv. 437, 453 (2011) ("There can be no
disagreement that independence and neutrality are critical to effective functioning of any
adjudicative body" that resolves sports disputes).
95 James A. R. Nafziger, International Sports Law, in HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 3, 17 (James A. R. Nafziger & Stephen F. Ross eds.,201 1).
96 Id. at 19-20.
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that "many issues of fairness cannot be pigeon-holed as either 'procedural' or
'substantive,"' he suggests that its defining characteristics include
"impartiality, equity, good faith, and coherence in the sense of consistency
and uniformity." 97
To provide procedural fairness and substantive justice,98 a private legal
system for resolving Olympic and international sports disputes must have, at
a minimum, the following components: 1) an open forum accessible to all
aggrieved parties, particularly athletes whose eligibility to participate in
sports competitions is or may be adversely affected, who have the right to
legal counsel; 2) independent and impartial adjudicators; 3) a full and fair
opportunity for all parties to be heard; 4) timely, reasoned, and final
decisions; and 5) the development of a clearly articulated uniform body of
law (which provides equal and unbiased treatment of those similarly situated)
resulting in the consistent, predictable application of Olympic sport
governing body regulations and rules of law.
V. ANALYSIS OF CAS ARBITRATION IN LIGHT OF PROCEDURAL
FAIRNESS AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE CONCERNS
This Section considers whether the CAS arbitration system has sufficient
indicia of procedural fairness (i.e., an impartial, unbiased, and dispassionate
adjudicative process) and substantive justice (i.e., objective and equitable
results) to justify substantial judicial deference and sovereign recognition of
its awards, particularly those that resolve disputes between the IOC or an IF
and an athlete.
97 Id. at 20.
98 "Empirical research reveals that decisionmaking and dispute resolution
procedures [including arbitration] are most likely to be effective if they are perceived as
procedurally fair. If parties perceive a dispute resolution or decisionmaking process as
procedurally fair, they are more likely to perceive the outcome as substantively fair even
if it is adverse to them, comply with that outcome, and perceive the institution that
provides or sponsors the process as legitimate... Four process characteristics reliably
predict parties' perceptions of fairness: the opportunity for parties to express themselves
and their positions ('voice'), demonstration of sincere consideration of these expressions
by a trustworthy decisionmaker ('being heard'), even-handed treatment and the neutrality
of the forum, and dignified, respectful treatment. Parties assess decisionmakers'
trustworthiness in order to determine whether they 'can trust that in the long run the
[decisionmaking] authority with whom they are dealing will work to serve their
interests."' Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of
Mediation into Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 71, 95-
98 (2013).
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A. Open Forum Accessible to Athletes Represented by Counsel
The CAS arbitration system provides an open forum fully accessible to
all aggrieved parties,99 including athletes whose eligibility to participate in
Olympic or other international sports competitions is adversely affected by
IOC or IF rules or decisions. The CAS ad hoc Division ensures "'fair, fast,
and free resolution of an athlete's eligibility to compete in the Olympic
Games." 100All parties in the CAS ad hoc Division and appeals arbitration
have the right to be represented by legal counsel of their choice.10 1
Volunteer lawyers may be available to represent athletes without charge in
CAS ad hoc Division proceedings, although their availability generally is
dependent on the willingness, language skills, and expertise of the local bar.
Pursuant to Article S6(9) of the Code, ICAS has created "a legal aid fund
to facilitate access to CAS arbitration for individuals without sufficient
financial means"1 02 and established guidelines for its operation. 103 CAS
appeals arbitration proceedings in which athletes are challenging IF rules or
decisions against them (which include doping sanctions) are free of charge
except for a filing fee of CHF 1,000 (approximately $1,000), which may be
waived if the athlete qualifies for legal aid; the arbitrators' costs and fees are
borne administratively by the CAS. 104 Unless they qualify for legal aid,
athletes must pay their own attorneys' fees and expenses. If an athlete is the
prevailing party, the CAS panel resolving the dispute has the discretion to
99 The Code establishes procedures for third parties whose interests may be affected
to be joined or to intervene in a CAS arbitration proceeding, and it authorizes a CAS
panel to permit non-parties to file amicus briefs. CODE, supra note 43, at R. 41.2, R.
41.3, & R. 41.4. For example, because it was a particularly significant case that would
determine the eligibility of athletes who previously had been suspended more than six
months to participate in the London Olympic Games, interested non-parties were
permitted to submit amicus briefs in CAS 2011/0/2422, USOC v. IOC, award of 4
October 2011. Nine amicus briefs were filed by various organizations, including
WADA, several anti-doping agencies, two NOCs, and two athlete groups. Id. at 6.
100 Mitten & Davis, supra note 71, at 79.
101 CODE, supra note 42, at R30.
102 Id. S6(9).
103 See CAS, GUIDELINES ON LEGAL AID BEFORE THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR
SPORT (2013), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/7099/
5048/0/Legal2OAid2ORules2OENG20_cleanFINAL.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON
LEGAL AID].
104 CODE, supra note 42, S6(5.2).
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order the IF to pay a contribution towards his legal fees and other expenses
(although the converse also is true). 105
B. Independent and Impartial Arbitrators
The CAS arbitration system currently appears to have adequate
safeguards necessary to ensure that sports disputes will be resolved by
independent and impartial arbitrators. In 1993, in G. v. Federation Equestre
Internationale (Gundel),106 the SFT ruled that "the CAS is a true arbitral
tribunal independent of the parties," which "offers the guarantees of
independence upon which Swiss law makes conditional the valid exclusion
of ordinary judicial recourse." Subsequently, in A. and B. v. IOC and FIS
(Lazutina),107 a 2003 case, the SFT rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
the CAS is not impartial when it decides a dispute between an athlete and the
IOC. It ruled that the CAS, whose operations have been overseen by the
ICAS since 1994, is sufficiently independent from the IOC for its arbitration
decisions "to be considered true awards, equivalent to the judgments of State
courts." 108 It concluded: "As a body which reviews the facts and the law
105 Id. S6(5.3).
106 G v. Federation Equestre International, in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998,
supra note 74, at 561, 568-69. To date, there has been only one CAS award challenged
by an American athlete in a U.S. court pursuant to the New York Convention treaty, and
it did not involve a claim that the CAS arbitration system was not sufficiently
independent and impartial for a U.S. court to recognize and enforce its awards. See
Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Inc., 2008 WL 2567657 (N.D. Fla. June 24, 2008).
Although the CAS's "closed list" of arbitrators system has been upheld by the SFT, it is
being challenged in pending litigation before the European Court of Human Rights on the
ground it is not sufficiently independent to comply with Article 6(1) of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
establishes an individual's right to a "fair trial." Antonio Rigozzi, Erika Hasler, &
Brianna Quinn, The 2011, 2012, and 2013 Revisions to the Code of Sports-related
Arbitration, JUSLETTER, June 3, 2013, at 3.
107 A. and B. v. IOC and FIS, in Digest of CAS Awards III 2001-2003, supra note
74, at 674.
108 Id. at 689. The SFT relied on the ICAS's independence and autonomy to support
its holding. It observed that ICAS "can amend its own Statutes (Art. S25 of the Code),
does not take orders from the IOC and is not obliged to abide by the IOC's decisions." Id.
at 684. It noted that the ICAS is an independent body "responsible for drawing up the list
of [CAS] arbitrators." Id. at 686. Although the IOC funds one-third of the annual costs of
the operations of the ICAS and CAS, it does not fund the operational costs of CAS ad hoc
Divisions, and the ICAS manages its funds and approves the CAS's budget. Id. at 687.
Observing that "State courts in countries governed by the rule of law are often required to
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with full powers of investigation and complete freedom to issue a new
decision in place of the body that gave the previous ruling, the CAS is more
akin to a judicial authority independent of the parties."1 09
The Code provides that ICAS, in establishing the roster of CAS
arbitrators, shall select persons with "legal training, recognized competence
with regard to sports law and/or international arbitration, a good knowledge
of sport in general and a good command of at least one CAS working
language [English or French], whose names and qualifications are brought to
[its] attention ... including by the JOC, the IFs and the NOCs." 110 When
appointing arbitrators, ICAS is required to "consider continental
representation and the different juridical cultures." 1  CAS arbitrators must
be independent, objective and impartial in rending their decisions, maintain
confidentiality, and agree not to represent any parties in proceedings before
the CAS. 112 As of November 1, 2013, there are 283 CAS arbitrators from
72 countries, including 30 from the U.S., who have been appointed by ICAS
for four-year renewable terms. 113
The Code does not limit a party's discretion and freedom to select any
arbitrator in the pool of CAS arbitrators, but some commentators have
expressed concerns about the independence of CAS arbitrators because "in
practice, the pool of arbitrators selected by parties is relatively small" and
rule on disputes involving the State itself, without their judges' independence being
questioned on the ground they are financially linked to the State," the SFT concluded
"there is not necessarily any relationship of cause and effect between the way a judicial
body is financed and its level of independence." Id. at 688.
109 Id. at 686.
110 CODE, supra note 42, S14. ICAS formerly appointed CAS arbitrators largely
from a pool of nominees initially proposed by the IOC, IFs, and NOCs. Although these
organizations still may nominate prospective arbitrators, the Code now permits any
person who wants to be considered for appointment to the CAS to self-nominate by
filling out a form on the CAS website. Id. S14. This process broadens the pool of
prospective CAS arbitrators beyond those nominated by Olympic sports governing
bodies. Lenard, supra note 46, at 179 (Current ICAS member advocates "there should be
closed lists. People should not pick just the arbitrators that they want to 'represent' them.
There is an important body of sports knowledge cases, even in non-doping, that
arbitrators must know.").
111 CODE, supra note 42, S16.
112 Id. S18 & S19. Although CAS arbitrators previously were permitted to represent
parties in CAS arbitrations, the Code now prohibits them from doing so. Id. S18.
113 The Code requires there to be a minimum of 150 CAS arbitrators. Id. S13. See
CAS, LIST OF CAS ARBITRATORS PER NATIONALITY (2013), available at http://www.tas-
cas.org/d2 wfiles/document/452/5048/0/Liste2Odes2Oarbitres2Opar2OnationalitC3%A92
0_octobre202013 .pdf.
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"largely homogenous in age, gender, and nationality."1 14 The Code requires
that a chosen arbitrator "shall be and remain impartial and independent of the
parties and shall immediately disclose any circumstances which may affect
his independence with respect to any of the parties."1 15 It permits a party to
challenge an arbitrator's appointment "if the circumstances give rise to
legitimate doubts over his independence or over his impartiality," and
requires the ICAS to provide a reasoned determination of any challenges. 116
In Alejandro Valverde Belmonte v. Comitato Olimpico Nazionale
Italiano (Belmonte),117 the SFT held that "[s]imilarly to a state judge, an
arbitrator must present sufficient guarantees of independence and
impartiality" and that "[b]reaching that rule leads to irregular composition [of
a CAS panel] pursuant to Art. 190(2)(a) PILA."1 18 It concluded that "the
independence and the impartiality demanded from the members of an arbitral
tribunal extend to the party appointed arbitrators as well as to the chairman of
the arbitral tribunal." 1l9 However, the SFT acknowledged that "absolute
independence by all arbitrators is an ideal which will correspond to reality
only rarely,"1 20 observing that there is a closed list of CAS arbitrators who
must have legal training and recognized expertise regarding sport and the
existing historical associations and contacts many CAS arbitrators have with
Olympic sports organizations, administrators, and counsel as well as others
associated with the Olympic Movement. Thus, it ruled that "an arbitrator
may not be challenged merely because he was chosen by one of the parties to
the dispute" 1 21 and there is "no justification for a special treatment of CAS
arbitrators, namely to be particularly strict in reviewing their independence
114 Maureen A. Weston, Doping Control, Mandatory Arbitration, and Process
Dangers for Athletes in Professional Sports, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 5, 20 & n.81
(2009).
115 CODE, supra note 42, at R. 33.
116 Id. at R34.
117 Alejandro Valverde Belmonte y. Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano,
4A_234/2010 (1st Civ. Ct. 2010).
118 Id. at 9.
119 Id. at 12-13.
120 Id. 
-t 13.
121 Id.
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and impartiality."122 According to the SFT, this requires a case-by-case
determination rather than "immutable rules."123
C. Full and Fair Opportunity to Be Heard
In Belmonte, the SFT ruled that, to be judicially recognized, a CAS
arbitration proceeding must provide each party with the following specific
rights:
to express its views on the essential facts for the judgment, to
present its legal arguments, to propose evidence on pertinent
facts and to participate in the hearing of the arbitral tribunal ...
have the possibility to. present their arguments . . . have an
opportunity to express its views on its opponent's arguments,
[and] to review and discuss its evidence and to challenge it with
its own evidence. 124
The de novo nature of a CAS arbitration panel's review in ad hoc
Division and appeals arbitration proceedings provides a full and fair
opportunity for all parties to be heard and to raise any relevant factual and
122 Id. at 14.
123 Id. at 15. In this case, the court concluded that the Italian Olympic Committee's
appointment of a Swiss law professor (who had previously participated in the revision of
the WADC and been appointed as an independent observer by WADA in connection with
the Athens Olympic Games) as an arbitrator in a doping case in which WADA
subsequently became a party did constitute the irregular composition of a CAS panel.
See generally Mitten, supra note 82, at 55-58.124 Belmonte, 4A_234/2010 at 22. Some legal scholars assert that CAS doping
proceedings should have more procedural protections to ensure athletes have a full and
fair opportunity to be heard. Because "[d]oping adjudications are imbued with many of
the elements of a civil and quasi-criminal proceeding, without corresponding process
protections," Professor Maureen Weston advocates that CAS procedural rules should be
amended to provide athletes with discovery rights and provide for appointment of
independent scientific experts to address the validity of positive test results. Weston,
supra note 114, at 46-48. Professor Michael Straubel contends that "[d]oping cases are
accusatory and quasi-criminal in nature and therefore fundamentally different from the
typical contract dispute decided by arbitration CAS" and suggests "CAS should consider
developing a second chamber, with separate procedures and arbitrators, to hear doping
cases." Straubel, supra note 62, at 1271-72; see also Haas, supra note 92 (discussing
whether Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, which creates an individual right to a "fair trial" with certain
procedural safeguards, applies to CAS arbitration proceedings).
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legal issues. Thus, CAS de novo review generally enables any procedural
flaws occurring during an Olympic or international sports governing body's
prior disposition of the matter to be cured. 125 For example, if the IOC or an
IF fails to provide an athlete with a hearing before taking adverse action
against him, this deficiency is remedied via a CAS arbitration proceeding.
D. Timely, Reasoned, and Final Decisions
The Code requires that CAS awards must be rendered quickly, which
ensures that an athlete's dispute with the IOC or an IF is resolved in a timely
manner, thereby minimizing any adverse effects if the athlete's appeal is
successful. 126 A CAS ad hoc Division award generally must be made within
24-hours of the filing of a request for CAS adjudication. 127 A CAS appeals
arbitration generally must be resolved within three months. 128
A CAS award must provide reasons for the resolution of each claim or
defense raised by the parties in order to be judicially recognized. In Canas v.
ATP Tour,129 the SFT vacated a CAS award because it failed to provide
reasons for rejecting arguments that his doping sanction violated United
States and European Union laws and remanded it to the CAS panel for
further consideration. The SFT ruled that CAS arbitrators are required to
discuss all of the parties' arguments in their legal analysis of the relevant
issues in dispute, including claims that applicable national, transnational, or
international laws have been violated. The panel must explain "even briefly"
their reasons "so that the petitioner could be satisfied upon a perusal of the
award that the arbitrators had considered all of his arguments which had
objective relevance, even if it was to dismiss them ultimately."1 30
Recognizing that "[fjinality as well as fairness is a desirable objective of
all litigation and arbitration," the CAS has adopted the doctrine of res
judicata, which precludes a CAS panel from subsequently considering "an
125 Mavromati & Pellaux, supra note 70, at 58.
126 CODE, supra note 42, at R. 59.
127 ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES, supra note 57, at art. 18.
128 CODE, supra note 42, at R. 59.
129 Canas v. ATP Tour, 4P.172/2006 at 5.3.
130 Id. The CAS panel subsequently remedied this deficiency by modifying its
award to provide brief reasons for concluding that the athlete's doping sanction did not
violate United States and European Union laws. Revised Award, CAS 2005/A/951,
Canas v. ATP, award of 23 May 2007, at 18.
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appeal against its own decision from a party to such decision."1 3 1 As one
CAS panel concluded "in the absence of consent, it should not revisit prior
decisions, where essentially the same parties are involved."1 32 Because all
CAS proceedings are governed by Swiss law, appeals of CAS awards must
be made to the SFT, which provides extremely limited review of the merits
of an arbitration award. Therefore, virtually all CAS awards effectively
provide a final and binding resolution of the parties' dispute. 133
E. Clearly Articulated Uniform Body ofLaw With Consistent,
Predictable Application
Although CAS ad hoc Division and appeals arbitration awards are
binding only on the parties, CAS panels frequently cite and rely on prior
awards addressing the same or similar issues. 134 As one CAS panel
observed: "In CAS jurisprudence there is no principle of binding precedent,
or stare decisis. However, a CAS Panel will obviously try, if the evidence
permits, to come to the same conclusion on matters of law as a previous CAS
Panel. Whether that is considered a matter of comity, or an attempt to build a
131 See, e.g., Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 009, In the
Matter Angel Perez, award of September 25, 2000, in CAS, CAS AWARDs-SYDNEY
2000 at 91, 98-99 (2000) (refusing to consider Cuban NOC's challenge to prior CAS
award determining that athlete met Olympic Charter's sport nationality requirement and
is eligible to compete for U.S. in Sydney Olympic Games).
132 Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 008, Arturo Miranda,
Canadian Olympic Ass'n, and Canadian Amateur Diving Ass'n v IOC, award of
September 24, 2000, in CAS, CAS AWARDS-SYDNEY 2000 at 83, 88 (2000) (noting that
"it may well have dismissed" on res judicata grounds an athlete's challenge to JOG
decision declaring him ineligible to compete in Sydney Olympics, which was previously
rejected in another CAS proceeding brought on his behalf by Canadian Olympic
Association, if IOC had objected to CAS consideration of his new claims).
133 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
134 Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler has noted: "[S]tatistics and history show a
strong reliance on other sports law cases. A survey of all the cases published by the
Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) from the first CAS case in 1986 to 2003 shows that
only one award in six cited prior cases. A review of the cases since 2003 shows a drastic
change; nearly every award contains one or more references to earlier CAS awards."
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23 ARB.
INT'L 357, 365 (2007). Matthieu Reeb, the CAS secretary general, publishes digests of
CAS Ad Hoc Division and appeals arbitration awards, and there is an index and database
of CAS awards on the CAS website http://www.tas-cas.org.
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coherent corpus of law, matters not." 135  As Professor Nafziger has
observed: CAS awards "provide guidance in later cases, strongly influence
later awards, and often function as precedent," which reinforce and help
elaborate "established rules and principles of international sports law." 136
To determine whether the CAS arbitration system results in the
development of a clearly articulated uniform body of law and its predictable
application in a consistent manner, the following issues will be analyzed: 1)
the role of CAS "precedent" in determining doping violations and sanctions
(a substantial part of the CAS docket requiring interpretation and application
of the WADC to the same or similar athlete conduct); 137 2) the role of CAS
"precedent" in determining an athlete's "sport nationality" for purposes of
135 International Assn. of Athletics Federations v. USA Track & Field and Jerome
Young, Arbitration CAS 2004/A/628, award of June 28, 2004, N 19. See also Anderson,
et al. v. IOC, Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1545, award of July 16, 2010, at T 55 ("although a
CAS panel in principle might end up deciding differently from a previous panel, it must
accord to previous CAS awards a substantial precedential value and it is up to the party
advocating a jurisprudential change to submit persuasive arguments and evidence to that
effect."); D'Arcy v. Australian Olympic Committee, Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1574 at 1
56, Award of 11 June 2008 ("Of course, we are not bound by any previous
determinations or awards of other panels of CAS. Arbitration awards are binding only by
contractual force on the parties and do not create precedents. However, where those
awards relate to the interpretation, scope or content of the CAS Code, considerations of
certainty and consistency suggest that subsequent panels should not take a different
approach to that adopted by earlier panels unless satisfied that the approach or view of
the earlier panel is an erroneous one or is inapplicable because of different circumstances
or different contractual language."). By comparison, a federal appellate court panel
"cannot overrule a prior decision of another panel" within the same circuit. Union of
Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees, AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S. I.N.S., 336 F.3d 200,
210 (2d Cir. 2003). A Second Circuit panel observed that it is "bound by the decisions of
prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court
or by the Supreme Court." United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004).
See also WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 695 (2d Cir. 2013).
136 JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 48-61 (2d ed. 2004); see
also Ian Blackshaw, Towards a "Lex Sportiva," 2011 INT'L SPORTS L. J. 140, 141
("Although CAS arbitrators are not generally obliged to follow earlier decisions and obey
the sacred Common Law principle of 'stare decisis' (binding legal precedent), in the
interests of comity and legal certainly, they usually do so. As a result of this practice, a
very useful body of sports law is steadily being built up.").
137 See What Kinds of Dispute Can Be Submitted to the CAS?, CAS, http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/20questions.asp/4- 3-2 17-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0/ (last visited Nov. 13,
2013); see also What Law Do the Arbitrators Apply? (2013), http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-226-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0/; see Case Law
Documents, supra note 75 (providing a database of all CAS decisions).
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his or her eligibility to participate in the Olympics or other international
sports competitions; and 3) the very narrow scope of national court review of
CAS awards also is considered.
1. Doping Violations and Sanctions
The CAS has exclusive jurisdiction and authority to finally resolve all
disputes between the IOC, IFs, NOCs, NFs, WADA, and athletes regarding
the application, interpretation, or enforcement of the WADC. 138  The
WADC is the "fundamental and universal document upon which the World
Anti-Doping Program in sport is based, and its purpose "is to advance the
anti-doping effort through universal harmonization of core anti-doping
elements."1 39 In resolving doping cases, CAS arbitrators are required to
interpret and apply the provisions of the WADC, the Code's procedural
rules, 140 and any applicable national laws. 14 1 Although a comprehensive
138 To comply with these international agreements as well as the Ted Stevens
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act's requirement that domestic Olympic sport eligibility
disputes be resolved by AAA arbitration, see 36 U.S.C. § 220509, United States Anti-
doping Agency (USADA) prosecutions of U. S. Olympic sport athletes for doping
violations are adjudicated by a three-person panel of North American CAS/AAA
arbitrators (which is essentially a national doping tribunal). An athlete who is dissatisfied
with the panel's arbitration award has the right to a de novo CAS appeals arbitration
proceeding (as do USADA, the IF for the sport in which the athlete participates, and
WADA). AM. ARB. Ass'N, SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR THE ARBITRATION OF
OLYMPIC SPORT DOPING DISPUTES, in USADA, PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC AND
PARALYMPIC MOVEMENT TESTING R-45 (2009). See Armstrong v. Tygart, 886 F. Supp.
2d 572, 586 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (procedural rules governing North American CAS/AAA
doping arbitrations "are sufficiently robust to satisfy the requirements of due process").
But see Straubel, supra note 62, at 1223-72 (expressing concerns about the fairness of
these procedural rules to athletes).
139 WADC, supra note 20, at 10.
140 According to one commentator, who does not reference any particular CAS
awards:
[S]ome CAS arbitrators consider-quite wrongly-that they can ignore
the rules in doping cases and decide cases on the basis of fairness
alone, justifying this point of view on the basis that in appeal cases
they can deal with the case de novo, pursuant to Article R57 of the
CAS Code . . . and also relying on the fact that the CAS has become
the "Supreme Court of World Sport." In effect, such CAS Panel
members are claiming to be free to rewrite the applicable legal rules in
the interests of what they consider fairness in the circumstances of the
particular case. This is a dangerous course of action and not conducive
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review and analysis of the hundreds of CAS doping awards is outside the
scope of this Article, some illustrative examples and published scholarship
establish that CAS panels generally cite and follow prior CAS awards (or at
least rely on them for guidance) in resolving several issues arising in
connection with doping disputes.
CAS panels have consistently followed USA Shooting & Quigley v.
International Shooting Union,142 a 1995 case upholding strict liability for
doping offenses if clear notice of this standard is provided to athletes. 143
This standard subsequently was codified by the WADC. 144
An empirical analysis of twenty-three CAS doping awards for the
sport of track and field from 2000-2010 revealed that seventeen
awards contain at least one citation to a prior CAS award, and that the
panel either followed or distinguished these previous awards on four
to legal certainty. Or put another way, is contrary to a so-called "rule
of sports law."
Blackshaw, supra note 136, at 141-42.
141 Pursuant to the Code's choice of law rules, CAS doping panels generally apply
Swiss law because WADA, as well as the IOC and most IFs (whose anti-doping rules
must be consistent with the WADC), are based in Switzerland. Annie Bersagel, Is There
a Stare Decisis Doctrine in the Court ofArbitration for Sport? An Analysis of Published
Awards for Anti-Doping Disputes in Track and Field, 12 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L. J. 189,
193, n. 30 (2012) ("Forty-seven international sports federations are based in Switzerland,
compared to five in Monaco, the next most popular federation host country."). See, e.g.,
Int'l Cycling Federation v. Jan Ullrich & Swiss Olympic, CAS 2010/A/2083 4, award
of 9 February 2012 (explaining that Swiss arbitration legislation applies because the
parties are domiciled in Switzerland); Straubel, supra note 60, at 1254 ("Swiss law,
because it has a rich history of dealing with sports law issues and because it has been
widely and consistently used by many CAS panels, is as good if not better than any other
country's law."). In doping cases, CAS panels often find other national, transnational,
and international laws to be either inapplicable or not violated. See, e.g., Gatlin v.
USADA, CAS 2008/A/1461 and IAAF v USA Track & Field and Gatlin, CAS
2008/A/1462, award of 10 September 2008 at 11 (use of athlete's 2001 doping offense to
enhance his sanction for 2006 doping offense does not violate Americans With
Disabilities Act); Revised Award, CAS 2005/A/95 1, Canas v. ATP, award of 23 May
2007, at 18 (athlete's doping sanction does not violate European Union law, even if it
applies). See also Mitten & Opie, supra note 1, at 300 (observing that "CAS panels
generally have refused to rule that athlete doping rules and sanctions violate the national
laws of an athlete's home country.").
142 USA Shooting & Quigley v. International Shooting Union, CAS 94/129, award
of 23 May 1995, in CA S, DIGEST OF CAS AwARDs: 1986-1998 at 187 (Matthieu Reeb
ed., 1998).
143 Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 134, at 365-366.
144 WADC, supra note 20, art. 2.1.1 & cmt.
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separate issues: "(1) use of a particular testing method or procedure as
evidence of a doping violation; (2) substance of parties' right to be
heard; (3) rules of evidence; and (4) general principles of equity." 45 In
addition, CAS panels have followed prior cases in applying the
equitable doctrine of lex mitior,146 pursuant to which "if newly
applicable sanctions are less severe than those in effect at the time of
the offense, the new sanctions must be applied." 47
Professor Nafziger observes that "CAS has been at its best when,
for example, it has taken fully into account its past awards and those of
national tribunals to evaluate the fairness, on a comparative basis of
equality, of a proposed [doping] sanction against an athlete." 48 In
Chagnaud v. FINA,149 the CAS ruled that sports governing bodies
"should make allowance for an appreciation of the subjective elements
in each case" in order to determine "a just and equitable sanction."
Rather than a fixed minimum sanction for all doping offenses (e.g., a
two-year suspension), the CAS panel expressed its preference for "a
sliding scale of suspension periods depending on the degree of fault of
the athlete." 50 This principle of proportionality was incorporated into
145 Bersagel, supra note 141, at 201. Acknowledging that "[n]o CAS panel has gone
so far as to explicitly recognize a principle of stare decisis," she concludes that "panels'
frequent citations to previous CAS awards suggests a de facto doctrine of stare decisis
may already be in operation. ... Alternatively, what appears to be a doctrine of stare
decisis from the perspective of a common law scholar may be more accurately described
as a doctrine of jurisprudence constante, in which the CAS generally follows the weight
of past precedent, but remains free to depart from previous awards in the interests of
justice." Id. at 195-196. She notes that her "study provides no support for the theory that
an arbitrator's background determines a panel's approach to precedent" because "the
percentage of awards that cited previous arbitral awards was actually slightly higher for
[the three exclusively] civil law panels [of jurists] than for [the five exclusively] common
law panels [of jurists]. For mixed panels, twelve of fourteen cited to past precedents." Id.
at 203-04.
146 See, e.g., USADA v. Brunemann, Am. Arb. Ass'n/N. Am. CAS Panel, AAA No.
77-190-E-00447-08 JENF at 20-21 (Jan. 26, 2009) (observing that "[t]his doctrine is well
established in lex sportiva through many cases arising in several different sports" and
citing numerous CAS awards applying it in doping cases).
147 Id. at 20. See also Ullrich CAS 2010/A/2083, 54 (applying a UCI rule that
allows for application of lex mitior).
148 NAFZIGER, supra note 95, at 28.
149 Arbitration Chagnaud v. FINA, CAS 95/141, 16, Award of April 22, 1996, in
DIGEST OF CAS AwARDS 1986-1998, supra note 42, at 215, 220-21.
150 Id. at T 19.
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the WADC, which provides that the presumptive 2-year suspension for
a first doping offense (and lifetime suspension for a second offense)' 5'
may be reduced based on the athlete's level of fault (i.e., no fault or
negligence, or significant fault or negligence).15 2
Professor Kaufmann-Kohler observes:
[S]ince the adoption of the [WADC], CAS panels
ruling on non-significant fault have systematically
considered other awards. Characteristically, the second
award rendered under the [WADC] referred to the first
one, distinguished it, and concluded that 'in the absence
any pertinent precedent, the Panel is of the opinion that
the application of 'No Significant Fault or Negligence'
is to be assessed on the basis of the particularities of the
individual case at hand.' Ever since, CAS panels
consistently have adopted the same reasoning.
Inevitably, the analysis of the growing number of
precedents has become more elaborate. In one of the
latest awards, the panel referred to no less than 11
previous precedents before reaching its conclusion.153
Two recent, related pairs of CAS awards considering essentially
similar legal issues provide illustrative examples of CAS panels'
prevailing practice of generally following prior awards.
In USOC v. IOC & IAAF,154 a CAS panel held that the U.S. 1,600-
meter relay team could retain the gold medal it won during the 2000
Sydney Games, although Jerome Young, who had competed in a
151 WADC, supra note 20, art. 10.2.
152 Id. art. 10.5. If the athlete satisfies the difficult burden of proving no fault or
negligence, he is not suspended for any period of time. Id. art. 10.5.1. If the athlete
proves no significant fault or negligence, the standard suspension may be reduced by up
to one-half of its presumptive length. Id. art. 10.5.2. In some instances, CAS awards have
applied the Chagnaud proportionality principle to reduce an athlete's sanction by more
than the maximum length prescribed by the WADC. See, e.g., Puerta v. Int'l Tennis
Fed'n, CAS 2006/A/1025, award of 12 July 2006. See generally Daniel Gandert, The
Battle Before the Games: The British Olympic Association Attempts to Keep Its Lifetime
Ban for Athletes with Doping Offenses, 32 Nw.J. INT'L LAW & Bus. 53A (2012).
153 Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 134, at 366.
154 USOC v. IOC, CAS 2004/A/725, award of July 20, 2005.
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preliminary round as a member of the team, subsequently was found
guilty of a 1999 doping offense that rendered him ineligible to
compete in the Sydney Games. The panel found that the IAAF's rules
in effect in 2000 concerned only the disqualification, ineligibility, and
annulment of an individual athlete's performance results for a doping
offense; it was not until their amendment in 2004-2005 that the rules
expressly required disqualification of the results of any relay team for
which an ineligible athlete competed.' 55 In support of its ruling, the
panel concluded that "clarity and predictability are required so that the
entire sport community are informed of the normative system in which
they live, work and compete, which requires at the very least that they
be able to understand the meaning of rules and the circumstances in
which those rules apply." 56 Based on USOC v. IOC & 1AAF, in
Anderson, et al. v. IOC,157 another CAS panel ruled that U.S. women's
teams that won gold medals in the 4 x 100 meters and 4 x 400 meters
relay events in the 2000 Sydney Games should not be disqualified,
which enabled seven team members to keep the medals they had won.
Although Marion Jones ran in both medal-winning final relays and
subsequently admitted to a doping offense during the Games resulting
in her individual disqualification and return of medals, this panel
agreed with "the convincing analysis of the CAS 2004/A/725 panel
[USOC v. IOC & IAAF] and sees no reason to reach a different
conclusion" regarding the applicable IAAF rule in effect in 2000.158
Similarly, in British Olympic Association (BOA) v. World Anti-
Doping Agency, 159 a CAS panel adopted the reasoning -of USOC v.
JOC,160 a prior CAS award by the same three-person panell 61 that
invalidated the IOC's "Osaka Rule" (which prohibited an athlete
155 Id. at 14.
156 Id. at 20.
157 Anderson v. IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, award of July 16, 2010.
158 Id. at T 61.
159 BOA v. WADA, CAS 201 1/A/2658, award of 30 April 2012.
160 USOC v. IOC, CAS 2011/0/2422, award of 4 October 2011.
161 Rule 50 of the Code provides: "When two or more cases clearly involve the
same issues, the President of the Appeals Arbitration Division may invite the parties to
agree to refer these cases to the same Panel; failing any agreement between the parties,
the President of the Division shall decide [the appropriateness of having the same panel
resolve the cases]." CODE, supra note 42, R50.
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sanctioned with a suspension of more than six months from
participating in the next Olympic Games) because this was a
disciplinary sanction not permitted by the WADC. Concluding that a
British Olympic Association bylaw providing that an athlete found
guilty of a doping offense is ineligible for selection to the British
Olympic team also is inconsistent with the exclusive disciplinary
sanctions established by the WADC, the BOA panel expressly
accepted and relied on the USOC panel's interpretation of what
constitutes a sanction for a doping violation. 162
On the other hand, there are some instances in which different
CAS panels have reached conflicting conclusions regarding
interpretation of the same WADC provision. This results in
inconsistent resolution of the same legal issues and inhibits the
development of a uniform body of international doping jurisprudence.
For example, the Oliveira v. USADAl 63 CAS panel was the first one to
consider the meaning of the language "corroborating evidence in
addition to his or her word which establishes to the comfortable
satisfaction of the hearing panel the absence of an intent to enhance
sports performance," which is one of the predicate requirements an
athlete must prove to justify a suspension of less than two years for use
of a banned "specified substance" under Article 10.4 of the 2009
WADC. Finding "the express language of this clause is ambiguous and
susceptible to more than one interpretation,"1 64 the panel concluded it
required the athlete "only to prove her ingestion of [the specified
substance] was not intended to enhance her sport performance." 165
162 As described in the USOC Award, ... Article 10.2 of the WADA Code
prescribes a "period of ineligibility" to be imposed for a doping offense. The Panel there
found that the IOC Regulation was a sanction because it made an athlete ineligible to
participate and, thus, compete in the next Olympic Games ... Similarly, the effect of the
Bye-Law in rendering the athlete found guilty of a doping offence to be ineligible to be
selected to Team GB is immediate, automatic and for life ... The difference in the
wording of the Bye-Law and the IOC Regulation is inconsequential ... The fact of the
matter is that, by operation of the Bye-Law, an athlete is unable to participate in the
Olympics. Accordingly, this Panel finds that the Bye-Law renders an athlete ineligible to
compete-a sanction like those provided for under the WADA Code. CAS 201 1/A/2658,
at f 8.22-8.25.
163 Oliviera v. USADA, CAS 2010/A/2107, award of 6 December 2010.
164 Id. at 9.13.
165 Id. at 9.17.
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Another .CAS panel followed Oliveira's construction of this
provision,166 but two other CAS panels disagreed and determined this
provision requires the athlete to prove no intent to enhance sport
performance through the use of the product containing the specified
substance.167
2. Sport Nationality Requirements
To maintain the integrity of Olympics and other international
sports competitions, the IOC and IFs have rules that define an athlete's
current sport nationality (which is limited to one country), provide that
he or she is eligible to compete only for that country, and establish
requirements for changing one's sport nationality.168 Disputes
regarding an athlete's sport nationality may arise when an athlete with
dual nationality now desires to compete for a country different from
166 Querimaj v IWF, CAS 2012/A/2822, award of September 12, 2012.
167 Foggo v NRL, CAS A2/201 1, award of May 2011; ITF v Kutrovsky, CAS
2012/A/2804, award of October 3, 2012.
168 Rule 41 of the Olympic Charter, which is titled "Nationality of Competitors,"
states:
1. Any competitor in the Olympic Games must be a national of
the country of the NOC which is entering such competitor. 2. All
matters relating to the determination of the country which a competitor
may represent in the Olympic Games shall be resolved by the IOC
Executive Board. Bye-lawsl and 2 to Rule 41 provide as follows:"1. A
competitor who is a national of two or more countries at the same time
may represent either one of them, as he may elect. However, after
having represented one country in the Olympic Games, in continental
or regional games or in world or regional championships recognised
by the relevant IF, he may not represent another country unless he
meets the conditions set forth in paragraph 2 below that apply to
persons who have changed their nationality or acquired a new
nationality. 2. A competitor who has represented one country in the
Olympic Games, in continental or regional games or in world or
regional championships recognised by the relevant IF, and who has
changed his nationality or acquired a new nationality, may participate
in the Olympic Games to represent his new country provided that at
least three years have passed since the competitor last represented his
former country. This period may be reduced or even cancelled, with
the agreement of the NOCs and IF concerned, by the IOC Executive
Board, which takes into account the circumstances of each case.
OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 5, at 78.
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the one he or she previously competed for during the Olympics or
another international sports competition.
Applying "general principles of law," CAS panels have recognized
that international sports governing bodies have a valid need to
establish rules defining the sport nationality of athletes with dual
nationality, (which necessarily must be only one country at a given
time) and a reasonable waiting period (e.g., three years) that must
elapse before an athlete changing his or her sport nationality is eligible
to compete for another country in Olympic or international
competitions.169 The CAS will enforce clear sport nationality rules that
further the legitimate interests of the IOC or IF, even if a rule imposes
hardship upon particular athletes in individual cases or "operates in
such a fashion as to cause the overall duration of an emigrating
athlete's fiture Olympic eligibility to depend on the particular
naturalization regime of the country in which he or she chooses to
relocate."l 7 0 Consistent with the traditional, limited role of common
law courts historically, the CAS will not "judicially" legislate new
169 Arbitration CAS 92/80, B. v. FIBA, award of March 25, 1993, in DIGEST OF CAS
AWARDS 1986-1998, supra note 75, at 297, 302, 304-05. When interpreting and applying
sport nationality rules, the CAS must consider applicable national laws (or at times
international law) in determining an athlete's sport nationality, which generally requires
the athlete to be a legally recognized national of the same country. See, e.g., Arbitration
CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 001, USOC & USA Canoe/Kayak v. IOC
(Perez l), award of September 13, 2000, in CAS, CAS AWARDS-SYDNEY 2000 at 13, 21
(2000) (concluding that athlete did not acquire U.S. nationality before September 1997
even though not naturalized until 1999 on any grounds "defined in Olympic Charter, or
under international law, or indeed under U.S. law"); Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division
(O.G. Sydney 2000) 005, Angel Perez v. IOC (Perez Il), award of September 19, 2000, in
CAS, CAS AWARDS-SYDNEY 2000 at 53, 21 (2000) (ruling that athlete became
"stateless" under international law in 1993 and changed from Cuban to U.S. nationality in
the same year, making him eligible to compete in 2000 Olympics for U.S.).
170 Perez I, (O.G. Sydney 2000) 001, at 21. See also Arbitration CAS Ad hoc
Division (O.G. Beijing) 2008/006, Moldova Nat'l Olympic Comm. v. IOC, award of
August 9, 2008 in CAS, CAS AWARDS-BEIJING 2008 (2008) at 300, 301-302 ("this
Panel has no authority to waive any part thereof' of the Olympic Charter's nationality
rule). See generally Mitten & Davis, supra note 71, at 82-85 (summarizing CAS
jurisprudence regarding validity of IOC and IF athlete eligibility rules, including sport
nationality rules).
36
[Vol. 30:1 2014]
THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT
nationality rules despite the foregoing potential adverse
consequences. 171
As they do in resolving doping disputes, CAS panels cite prior
CAS awards in similar sport nationality cases and generally follow
them to ensure equal legal treatment of all athletes.172 In Christel
Simms v. Federation Internationale de Natation (FINA),173 the CAS
panel relied on a prior CAS award adopting the doctrine of "estoppel
by representation" in determining that an athlete had validly changed
her sport nationality and was eligible to compete for the Philippine
team at the Beijing Olympics. Because FINA (the IF for swimming)
had provided written confirmation that she could swim for the
Philippines and she had done so during the April 2008 FINA World
Championships in reliance upon this communication, FINA was
estopped from subsequently asserting she was ineligible to swim for
the Philippine team at the Beijing Olympics. The panel concluded that
"[t]o exclude her from competing under these circumstances will be
unfair and contrary to the rule of estoppel."l 74
Similarly, in Nabokov & Russian Olympic Committee & Russian
Ice Hockey Federation v. International Ice Hockey Federation
171 Perez I, (O.G. Sydney 2000) 001, at 21 ("The Panel is unwilling to engage in an
act of legislation."). This view is consistent with the admonition that U.S. courts have
given to arbitrators that resolve domestic sports disputes. Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling
Ass'n, Inc., 227 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Arbitrators are not ombudsmen; they
are authorized to resolve disputes under contracts and rules, not to declare how the world
should work in the large.").
172 In some cases resolving a dispute concerning an athlete's sport nationality, CAS
panels have implicitly recognized the precedent established by prior awards by
distinguishing them. See, e.g., Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 008,
Arturo Miranda, Canadian Olympic Ass'n, and Canadian Amateur Diving Ass'n v. JOC
(Miranda II), award of September 24, 2000, in CAS, CAS AWARDS-SYDNEY 2000 at
83, 89 (2000) (concluding that "statelessness" rule of Perez II, which involved a Cuban
defector, is inapplicable; this case is "fundamentally different" because athlete is simply a
non-resident Cuban, not a defector); Spanish Basketball Fed'n v. FIBA, Arbitration CAS
98/209, award of January 6, 1999 in CAS, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II: 1998-2000 at
500, 501-02 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2002) (observing that current "circumstances need
distinguishing from a previous CAS Case OG 98/004-005").
173 Arbitration CAS Ad hoc Division (O.G. Beijing) 2008/002, order of August 1,
2008, in CAS, CAS AWARDS-BEIJING 2008 (2008) at 270, 274.
174 Id. at 274.
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(IIHF),175 the CAS panel cited two prior CAS awards and observed
that "[p]revious CAS Panels have already expressed their view that
they will interpret the applicable rules in a way 'which seeks to discern
the intention of the rule maker, and not to frustrate it."' Construing and
applying the IIHF's sport nationality rule, the panel determined that an
athlete who had played for the Kazakh ice hockey team during the
1994 World Championships when he was nineteen years old was
ineligible to play for the Russian team during the 2002 OlympicS. 176 It
explained:
The Panel therefore has to acknowledge that the rule has always
been interpreted as providing a possibility of representing two
countries but only for players who were under the age of eighteen
when they represented their first country. Since the Panel finds this to
be a valid interpretation of the rule and since it has been interpreted in
that way ever since it was implemented, the Panel will not interpret it
differently. This is in the interest of fairness to all other players whose
eligibility for playing for another country has previously been denied
because of this particular interpretation of Bylaw 204 (1) c. 177
3. Very Narrow Judicial Review ofMerits of CAS Awards
National courts, including the SFT and U.S. courts, generally will
recognize and enforce a CAS ad hoc Division or appeals arbitration
award, the substantive merits of which will be invalidated only if it
violates the forum country's public policy under a very narrow
standard of judicial review. 178 Like the SFT, U.S. courts have adopted
a similar international standard in judicially reviewing CAS awards.179
As two legal scholars have observed: "Because one of the primary
objectives of establishing a private legal regime to resolve
international sports disputes is to create a uniform body of lex sportiva
that is predictable and evenly applied worldwide, it is problematic if
175 RIHF v. IlHF, CAS 2001/A/357, 8, award of January 31, 2002, in CAS,
DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS III: 2001-2003 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2004).
176 Id. at 27.
I77 Id. at 9.
178 See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
I79 Id.
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CAS awards are not judicially reviewed pursuant to a generally
accepted international standard."180
This very narrow scope of judicial substantive review of the merits
of CAS awards enables the development of a consistent body of
Olympic and international sports jurisprudence by the CAS, which
generally is globally recognized and enforced by national courts in the
148 countries that are signatories to the New York Convention. It also
facilitates the predictable interpretation and application of IOC and IF
rules (as well as the WADC) to resolve sports disputes by the CAS
arbitration system.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Because Olympic and other international sports competitions occur
worldwide and are based on consensual relationships among global
entities and athletes throughout the world, universally accepted rules
and a unitary dispute resolution system are necessary for their effective
internal governance and external regulation. A CAS panel's use of de
novo review in ad hoc Divigion and appeals arbitration proceedings
generally provides broader scrutiny of IOC and IF rules and decisions,
which is more favorable to Olympic and international sport athletes
than the very deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review
that national courts typically provide when reviewing the rules and
internal decisions of private sports governance bodies outside the
context of collectively bargained employment agreements.' 81
Moreover, "U.S. domestic sports law generally does not provide
[Olympic and international sport] athletes with greater legal rights than
the developing body of lex sportiva."l82
Based on the above analysis, the level of procedural fairness
afforded to Olympic and international sport athletes by the CAS
arbitration system and the need for a uniform body of international lex
180 Mitten & Opie, supra note 1, at 306.
181 See, e.g., D'Arcy v. Australian Olympic Comm., Arbitration CAS 2008/A 1l574,
Award of 11 June 2008 (observing that a CAS panel's duty to independently determine
the merits of an athlete's claims and defenses pursuant to the CAS Code is broader than a
court's rational basis review of an Olympic sports governing body's disciplinary action
against an athlete). See also supra notes 69-71.
182 Mitten & Opie, supra note 1, at 300.
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sportiva appear to justify requiring them to submit disputes with the
IOC and IFs to the CAS for final and binding resolution along with
very limited judicial review of CAS awards and their recognition and
enforcement by national courts.183 It is very difficult to objectively
measure the extent to which the CAS arbitration system produces
substantive justice (i.e., just results in individual cases), which has an
inherent degree of subjectivity. However, its procedural fairness
increases the likelihood of substantive justice, or at least tends to
alleviate any potential concerns about a lack of systematic substantive
justice. Perceptions of the fairness of outcomes in individual cases, a
prerequisite for the necessary "buy-in" by the parties to a sports
dispute as well as national governments and their respective judicial
systems, are directly related to the general level of confidence in the
fairness of the procedures by which CAS resolves these disputes.
Professor Nafziger accurately observes that the CAS has established
the "gold standard in resolving sports-related disputes" by "ensuring
fairness in terms of even-handedness, impartiality, acting in good faith,
and coherence." 84
As Professor Ken Foster, an English sports law scholar, explains:
The conclusion derived from describing lex sportiva as
a private system of transnational law is that such a
pluralistic notion of law allows us to see private
arbitration as a non-state arrangement not created by
governments but existing as a self-reflexive legal order,
183 Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.,
concurring)' ("[T]here can be few less suitable bodies than the federal courts for
determining the eligibility, or the procedures for determining the eligibility, of athletes to
participate in the Olympic Games.").
184 NAFZIGER, supra note 95, at 27-28. See also Allan Erbsen, The Substance and
Illusion of Lex Sportiva, in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra
note 32, at 454 ("CAS's jurisprudence fills what until recently was a disturbing legal
vacuum in international sports. Before the creation of CAS, the rights and obligations of
athletes and officials were ill-defined and were enforceable-if at all--only through
costly and lengthy litigation in national courts or in arbitration before tribunals staffed by
the same sports federations whose actions the tribunals were asked to judge. Legal claims
were thus difficult to frame, difficult to pursue, and for political outsiders, difficult to
win. Since 'e creation of CAS, rights and obligations have become more clearly defined
and understood, adjudication is more accessible, and arbitrators are more independent.").
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which is juridified in its own practice. This
juridification, with institutionalized forms of rule
creation and a forum for dispute settlement that respects
substantive and procedural justice, is the ultimate
reason why national courts will respect its exclusive
jurisdiction.'85
On the other hand, legitimate public policy questions may be
raised about whether such a limited scope of judicial review of CAS
arbitration awards effectively protects athletes' rights and interests,
given that IOC and IF rules require athletes to submit to CAS
jurisdiction as a condition of participating in Olympic and
international sports competitions and to forego their right to judicial
resolution of the merits of a dispute. This is even more problematic if a
CAS panel makes factual or legal errors, which are not subject to
correction by a national court. However, no public legal system is
error free; even courts make mistakes. On balance, a consistent body
of CAS jurisprudence that is uniformly applied to all the world's
Olympic athletes with limited disruption by national courts probably is
better than the risk of a potentially conflicting body of international
sports law unduly influenced by nationalistic interests through broader
judicial review.
The CAS arbitration system "demonstrates how civil and common
law legal systems can function effectively together within an
international tribunal to resolve a wide variety of complex, time-
sensitive disputes between parties of different nationalities," which
produces "globally respected adjudications" of Olympic and
international sports disputes.186 Although the CAS is a private arbitral
tribunal rather than a "court" established by agreement of sovereign
countries, it is a form of international legal pluralism that is developing
into, and functioning as a, de facto common law legal system.187 As
185 Ken Foster, Global Administrative Law: The Next Step For Global Sports Law?,
University of Westminster School of Law Research Paper No. 12-10, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-2057750.
186 Mitten & Opie, supra note 1, at 288.
187 See supra Section E. In contrast to court proceedings whereby judges usually are
randomly assigned to cases, the parties can select the person(s) who will arbitrate their
dispute. Kate Kennedy, Manifest Disregard in Arbitration Awards: A Manifestation of
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this unique, specialized form of international arbitration continues to
evolve, certain reforms that are not part of more traditional arbitration
systems appear necessary and should be considered to enhance the
level of procedural fairness and substantive justice afforded to athletes,
who generally are required to submit disputes to CAS arbitration as a
condition of participating in Olympic and other international sports
competitions.
Some legal scholars assert that the existence of legal aid for
athletes is "of crucial importance to sustain the legitimacy of the CAS
system"' 88 because "the obligation to submit sports disputes to
arbitration deprives athletes from the benefit of any legal aid as may be
available to them before the (otherwise) competent national courts." 89
They contend that an athlete "without sufficient financial resources
could rescind the arbitration agreement on the ground that it does not
afford him access to justice."190 Although this is a strong statement
with uncertain legal validity, it is important to ensure that athletes have
effective access to CAS arbitration. In an effort to achieve this
objective, the ICAS has established a legal aid fund for athletes, and
guidelines for them to be eligible for financial assistance and the
appointment of pro bono legal counsel in CAS proceedings.191 This is
Appeals Versus a Disregard for Just Resolutions, 16 J.L. & Pol'y 417, 420 (2007);
ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL
MODEL 458-59 (2d ed. 2011). Discovery generally is limited in arbitration proceedings,
and there are no strict rules limiting the evidence that arbitrators can consider. David
Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 452 (2011); Stephen K.
Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 522-23 (2009). Judicial
review of the merits of arbitration awards is much narrower than appellate court review
of trial court decisions because courts do not provide broad substantive review of
arbitration awards to correct mistakes of fact or law. Kennedy, supra, at 421-22. An
arbitration award will be vacated on substantive grounds only if it violates public policy,
or if the arbitrator acted arbitrarily and capriciously or manifestly disregarded the law.
Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241, 245-46 (1999); SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra, at 462-63.
188 Rigozzi, Hasler, & Quinn, supra note 106, at 17.
189 Id. at 17, n. 129.
190 Id
191 A natural person, such as an individual athlete without sufficient financial means
to defend his rights before the CAS, must prove "his income and assets are not sufficient
to allow him to cover the costs of proceedings, without drawing on that part of his assets
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a laudable recent development, but more resources from sources other
than ICAS may be needed to ensure that all Olympic and international
sport athletes are adequately represented by knowledgeable counsel,
particularly in CAS cases requiring specialized legal expertise. 192
Although all CAS ad hoc Division awards and most appeals
arbitration awards are published, it is important to ensure their ready
availability to arbitrators, athletes, sports governing bodies, attorneys,
and academics to facilitate "predictable and equitable decision
making" by the CAS.193 As one commentator has observed, "CAS
panels are extremely reluctant to depart from precedent, [i]n the
interest of fairness to the parties, it is therefore critical that the CAS
publish all non-confidential awards, and refrain from allowing parties
to rely on confidential awards." 94
In addition, ICAS should examine and evaluate whether its
existing internal procedures are sufficient to effectively minimize the
possibility of conflicting interpretation and application of the WADC,
necessary to support him and his family." GUIDELINES ON LEGAL AID, supra note 103,
art. 5. The athlete must provide "supporting documents, e.g., tax returns, contract of
employment, statement of salary, lease" and "set out, in a summary fashion, the grounds
of his appeal/defence to establish that his appeal/defence has a legal basis." Id. art. 9. The
ICAS President provides a reasoned decision regarding a request for legal aid, which is
not subject to any appeal. Id. art. 10. The request "will be refused if it is obvious that the
applicant's claim or grounds of defence have no legal basis" or are frivolous or
vexatious." Id. art. 5. The ICAS President may grant the following forms of legal aid to
an athlete: not requiring payment of the costs of the CAS procedure or an advance of
costs; permitting him to choose pro bono counsel from a list established by ICAS; and/or
granting a lump sum to cover his own travel and accommodation costs and those of his
pro bono counsel as well as his witnesses, experts and interpreters in connection with a
CAS hearing. Id. art. 5.
192 Because athletes accused of doping violations need access to competent legal
counsel to accurately evaluate the validity of charges and to effectively defend
themselves, Professor Maureen Weston proposes that Olympic sports organizations
establish and fund a group of athlete advocates with specialized training to advise and
represent athletes in doping matters. Weston, supra note 114, at 49.
193 Richard McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, in HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 32, 62-63 (James A. R. Nafziger & Stephen F. Ross eds.,
2011). See also Lenard, supra note 46, at 180 (recognizing that ICAS "must ensure
greater and equal accessibility to CAS opinions and precedent"); Mitten, supra note 82 at
60 (suggesting that "lack of general public access to all CAS appeals awards violates the
principles of good faith and equal treatment," which is required by Swiss law and public
policy).
194 Bersagel, supra note 141, at 205.
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Olympic Charter, and IF rules by different CAS panels. Currently, the
President of the CAS ad hoc Division (who is an ICAS member) is
required to review an ad hoc Division award before it is signed and
issued by the arbitrators and "without affecting the Panel's freedom of
decision may also draw [their] attention to points of substance." 95
Similarly, the CAS Secretary General reviews appeals arbitration
awards and "may also draw the attention of the Panel to fundamental
issues of priticiple."l 96 Legal scholars have proposed that ICAS
consider establishing a closed list of CAS panel presidents 197 or
alternative reforms such as single supreme appellate panel within
CAS198 to facilitate the development of a consistent body of
international lex sportiva. This is an important objective, but it is
important to ensure that any internal reform does not compromise the
timely and final resolution of Olympic and international sports
disputes by CAS ad hoc Division and appeals arbitration proceedings,
which is an essential component of the existing CAS system of
international legal pluralism, which generally provides an appropriate
level of procedural fairness and substantive justice to athletes in its
existing form.
195 ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES, supra note 57, art. 19.
196 OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 5, R. 46.
197 Rigozzi, Hasler, & Quinn, supra note 106, at 17 and 17, n.31 (observing that the
CAS may establish a special list of persons from its pool of arbitrators who would act as
the president of CAS panels; "having a closed list of Presidents would promote
consistency, and ensure that at least the key person in the Panel has the required expertise
and professionalism to ensure both speed and the quality of the award without having to
limit the parties' freedom in their choice of the arbitrator.").
198 Segan, supra note 93 ("When a case is lodged with CAS which raises a point of
general importance-the identification of which would be a matter for the President -
then the case would be relinquished to a five-arbitrator Grand Chamber for a binding
decision on the point. The rules of CAS would be amended so that future panels were
obliged to follow decisions of the Grand Chamber unless satisfied that a ruling was
clearly and obviously wrong."); Straubel, supra note 62, at 1272 (for CAS doping cases,
"a mechanism, such as a single supervisory panel, should be created to reconcile
conflicting precedent to ensure equal treatment and remove some of the arbitrariness of
panel decisions."); Maureen A. Weston, Simply a Dress Rehearsal? U.S. Olympic Sports
Arbitration and De Novo Review at the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 38 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 97, 128 (2009) ("For CAS to be a true 'Supreme Court for Sport,' it should
institute a formal appellate body akin to a U.S. Supreme Court with discretionary review,
to rule on conflicting interpretations of lex sportiva rendered by CAS panels.").
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